Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1941

J. B. S. Haldane and the Thomistic Argument from Motion For the
Existence of God
Cletus F. Hartmann
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Hartmann, Cletus F., "J. B. S. Haldane and the Thomistic Argument from Motion For the Existence of God"
(1941). Master's Theses. 203.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/203

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1941 Cletus F. Hartmann

J.B.S.Haldane and the Thomistic Argument
from Motion for the Existence of God

by
Cletus F. Hartmann, S.J., A.B.

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master ·of Arts in
Loyola University
Chicago, Ill.
June, 1941

•• •• •
l'amor che muove il Sole e l'altre stella.

(Par. XXXIII, 145)

~

Auctoris

Cletus Francis Hartmann, S.J., A.B., was born at Bellevue, Ky., August 22, 1912.

He received his elementary train-

ing at St. Anthony's School, Madisonville, Cincinnati,
1918-1919; at St. Joseph's School, Toledo,
Michael's School, Toledo,
School, Toledo,

o.,

o.,

1921-1926.

o.,

He received his secondary

He attended St •.John's College, Toledo,

o.,

o.,

_o.,

o., 1926-1930.
1933-1936, and

from which he graduated in 1937

with the degree of Bachelor of Arts.
of Jesus at Milford,

1919; at St.

1919-1921; and at St. Charles'

education at St. John's High School, Toledo,

De Sales College, Toledo,

o.,

He entered the Society

in Septeaber, 1937.

From 1937 to

1939 he was accredited at Xavier University, Cincinnati,

o.,

In September, 1939, he began the study of philosophy at West
Baden College, West Baden Springs, Ind., and for his graduate
studies was associated with Loyola University, Chicago, Ill.,
until June, 1941.

Table of Contents
page

Chapter I : Modern Contempt for the

The~st1c

Arguments. .1

Cnapter II : J.B.s.Haldane and His Philosophical
Inheritance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

9

Chapter III : The Possibility of a Rational
Demonstration • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16
Chapter IV : The Traditional Argument and Haldane's
Objections • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26
Chapter V : Critic ism of the Proof and of Haldane 1 s
Objections. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 35
Chapter VI : The Primus Motor Dmnobilis • • • • • • • • 65
Biblivgrapny

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 70

Introduction
Present-day thought outside Scholastic circles is in the
main an idolatry of the positive sciences and of the scientific method.

This scientism, with its claim for reason and sci-

ence of the power to explain everytning, has generated the
anti-intellectualism which constitutes the outstanding trait
of modern thought.
The root cause of all the confusion and aberrations of
the modern mind is undoubtedly ignorance of the true nature of
the intellect.

All the anti-intellectualist tirades are

directed not against the true intellect, but against a distortion of it by positivistic thinkers and against an exaggerated reason.

This is evident from even a cursory reading of

the works of contemporary philosophers and scientists.
fessor J.B.S.Haldane is a typical example.

Pro-

Sceptic, scoffer

at religious dogma and practice, and positivist of the deepest
dye, he castigates St. Thomas and his fellow Scholastics for
their "faulty logic, bad science, and bad mathematics." Ignoring entirely the metaphysics of Thomistic philosophy, he
rejects the proofs for the existence of God, concluding that
God's existence cannot be known by human reason.
Professor Haldane may be considered to stand for a large
school of modern philosophic thought outside Scholasticism.
His attacks on the

~uinque

Viae of St. Thomas Aquinas are

single examples
capability

o~

o~

the present-day depreciation

the human reason to attain to truth.

light, then, the author
subject.

o~

o~

the
In this

this thesis has considered his

This will explain the brief introductory cbe.pters

to the particular point 11nder discussion, namely, the argument

~rom

motion for the existence of God.

1

CHAPTER I
Modern Contempt for

~

Theistic Arguments

It is a Catholic doctrine that the existence of
God can be rationally proved. Few of your other beliefs are harder to swallow ••• But even if I believed
in your God I should find it extraordinarily difficult to believe that my faith could be rationally
grounded.l
Such is the way that Professor J.B.S.Haldane introduces
the reader of Science and the Supernatural to the traditional
~uinque

Viae of St. Thomas Aquinas.

In an exchange of letters

with the noted English convert to Catholicism, Arnold Lunn,
Professor Hladane showers blow after blow on every spot of the
body of catholic teaching and dogma.

Because of his eminent

position in British scientific circles he receives a wide
hearing, even though the arguments he advances and the attacks
he launches are echoes of a century of agnosticism and antiintellectualism.

In fact, the name Haldane may very well

stand as a generic one for that period, a period that has tria
to show the

incompati~ility

of science and religion, has

belittled and even denied the power of the human intelJ.e ct to
attain to truth, and bas scoffed at God and everything connected with Him.
That the theistic proofs should share in the contempt
which is being heaped upon reason is easily intelligible.

In

these arguments the mind makes its highest flights, soaring
aloft to the invisible throne of Him Who makes Himself known

2

by the things that are made.
of the traditional

ar~ments

Though respecting the antiquity
for God's existence, contemporary

uhilosophers outside Scholasticism are almost unanimous in

"'

proclaiming their inability to demonstrate God's existence.
The ancient arguments for His (God's} existence
are more or less discredited; it is agreed that
demonstration of God is impossible.2
In recent years theologians were inclined to
agree so far that rational arguments could not
establish the existence of God.3
There is a consensus of opinion that the
arguments are not valid in their present form ••• As
proofs they break down. They suggest probabilities,
probabilities of more or less degree, but they carry
no conviction to the minds of those who demand
cogent logic. 4
They have their use, these venerable friends,
but it is not that of a logical proof of the Divine
existence. They are all attempts (each in its own
way) to fill in with content and make definite to
ourselves the conception of God, Whose existence is
already supposed.5
-What He (God) is in Himself and what He is in
His relations to the gre~t universal phenomena, that
is matter of hypothesis.
Similar quotations from the works of contemporary philosophers could be multiplied.

The reasons for this almost

universal prejudice against the theistic arguments are not
difficult to find.
It has been said that Kant and Hume by their destructive
criticism of the theistic proofs once and for all exposed the
fallacies underlying the traditional arguments for God's
existence.

Kant apodictically states that from the facts of

nature no inference of God is justified, that philosophy took
over the idea of God from the concrete religious thought of the
past and tried to establish the truth of the divinity by means
of abstract logical processes.

His conclusion is that the

human mind is incapable of finding final proof for God's
existence.

But, how little Kant was acquainted with the

proofs set forth by St. Thomas and almost universally followed
by Scholastics, is seen from his inclusion of the ontological
argument among the theistic proofs.

He gives a good deal of

space to its refutation on the score that it involves the
metaphysical fallacy of hypostatizing an idea.7

We cannot

find fault with him there, though we do blame him for throwing
dust in the eyes of succeeding generations who prefer his
version of Thomistic theism to that of the original.

That many

philosophers followed Kant blindly in this is seen from a
quotation from William James:
The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have
felt entitled either to scout or to neglect them,
shows that they are not solid enough to serve as
religion's all-sufficient foundation ••• not only do
post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch,
but it is a plain historic fact that they have never
converted anyone.S
Many of the moderns are of the opinion that the theistic
arguments are inextricably bound up with Aristotelian and
medieval science.
see.

Haldane takes this for granted, as we shall

With the destruction of Aristotelian physics goes the

necessary rejection of the arguments for God's existence.

4

The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us the.t Aristotle's thought was enmeshed in the details o-r an
erroneous physics and an erroneous cosmology ••• Today we repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the
Aristotelian cosmology, so that the ~xact form of
the above argument manifestly fails.
The theistic arguments are said to imply philosophical and
scientific conceptions that have lost their meaning and been
superseded.

Since they depend on principles and mental methods

now abandoned, they must be wholly recast,

cr.,

preferably,

abandoned altogether.lO
Another preoccupation of modern philosophers is the history of religions and the evolutionary hypothesis, whereby they
attempt to reach conclusions prejudicial to the theistic
arguments.

The history of religions, they contend, proves that

theism evolved from polytheism, and that belief in God is
independent of the traddtional theistic arguments.

Moreover,

by the time the Scholastics came on the philosophic stage, the
idea of thei.sm had fully evolved, so that, ignorant of past
history, they thought that the concept of One God was a primitive and permanent possession of the human consciousness.

very

recent research among the primitive peoples of Africa and Asia
have demonstrated the falsity of the evolution process, and tha
all peoples have, in some guise or other, an idea of the One
God.
The exponents of anthropocentric philosophies reject the
theistic arguments because the God they prove can be of no
value or service to us.

The Deists denied Divine Providence,

5

asserting that God was so far above this world that He had no
concern for it.

The humanitarians want comradeship, warmth

and blessedness, for which the "bloodless categories of philosophic thought" can never satisfy these vital needs.ll
The vast literature of proofs for God's existence, drawn from the or.der of nature, which a century ago seemed so overwhelmingly convincing, today
does little more than gather dust in libraries, for
the simple reason that our generation has ceased to
believe in the kind of God it argued for ••• candidly
speaking, how do such qualities as these {God's
attributes) make any definite connection with our
life? And if they severally call for no distinctive
adaptations of our conduct, what vital difference
can it possibly make to a man 1 s religion whether they
be true or false?l2
Deus est ens, a se, extra et supra omne genus •••
definition reilly instr~ctive? It
means less than nothing, in its pompous role of
adjectives.l3

where~s-sucn-a

All these prejudices against the traditional arguments for
the existence of God have a root cause.

It is the disregard of

and positive contempt for the intelligence.

If we deny to man

this noble faculty, we deny its commensurateness with being,
the spontaneous and necessary principles that flow from being,
and condemn him to the absurdities and errors that characterize
modern thought.

Sense-perception, pure empiricism, nominalism

and agnosticism are the logical outcome.

For instance, the

empirics deny that the principle of causality is a necessary
truth, and that this principle

e~nbles

us to get away from the

order of phenomena in order to ascend to the first cause.

Hume

in reality denied intelligence, or at least reduced it to the
senses.
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All our general ideas are in reality but particular ideas to which a common ter.m is assigned,
and this latter occasionally recalls other particula
ideas which correspond in certain respects to the
idea that the mind actually has.l4
This is the essence of empiric nominalism.

John Stuart

Mill held almost the same views, though he plunged even deeper into empiricism.
What proof have we that only the intellectual
can produce that which is intellectual? Have we
any other means but experience for knowing what
thing produces another of its kind, what causes
are capable of producing certain effects? ••• Apart
from experience and especially for what goes by
the name of reason, which is concerned with the
self-evident, it seems that no cause can produce
an effect of a higher order than itself. But this
conclusion is entirely different from anything
we know about nature ••• The purpose of all the
researches of modern science is to convince us
completely that the higher forms of life are evolved from the lower, and that the more elaborate and
superior ~Sganization in life must yield to the
inferior.
Through his empirical principles Mill is led to admit
that there are no convincing proofs for theism.

Through his

nominalism he holds that the imagination affords us glimpses
of a God Who exists, and that it is not unreasonable for
anyone to hope that God exists provided he recognizes that
there are no proofs.
Herbert Spencer did not go as far as Mill in his form of
nominalism.

He accepts the existence of an external world,

but considers the "so-called" principle of causality as the
result of a habit which men have formed by having witnessed
the constant succession of the same phenomena.

His agnosti-

7

cism is the logical outcome of his nominalism.
It is impossible to avoid making the assumption of self-existence somewhere; and whether that
assumption be made nakedly (Theism) or under complete disguises (Pantheism, Atheism), it is equally
vicious, equally unthinkable ••• we find ourselves ·obliged to make certain assumptions; and yet we
find these assumptions cannot be represented in
thought. We are obliged to conclude that a first
cause, infinite, absolute or independent, does
exist; however, the materials of which the arguments
are built, equally with the conclusions based on
them, are merely s~bolic conceptions of the
illegitimate order.l6
Kantian empiricism and idealism are but two phases of
agnosticism.

The general principle of agnosticism is nothing

else but phenomenalism.

Human reason can have knowledge only

of phenomena and of the laws by which they are governed.

Our

ideas have no ontological value--we can form no concept of
the substantial being.

Likewise, they have no transcendental

value--they do not permit us to know God, the transcendental
Being, supposing He really exists.

Substance is simply a

collection of phenomena, and causality a succession of phenomena that cannot be said really to have been produced.

Per-

sonality is nothing else but a sequence of interior phenomena
mysteriously grouped together by our consciousness of them.
Reason can have knowledge only of phenomena, because between
it and the senses there is no essential difference.l7
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CHAPTER II
J.B.S.Haldane and His Philosophical Inheritance
The introductory chapter to this thesis has been far
from unnecessary.

An examination of Professor's Haldane's

works, and more particularly of Science

~

the Supernatural,

where he commits himaelf on definite teachings and dogmas of
the Catholic religion, will show that he is the inheritor of
,
the century-old melange of empiricism, nominalism and agnosticism.

In refuting his objections, then, we at the same time

go a long way toward refuting the modern agnostic mind.

We

could, of course, consider the Professor's objections against
the thesis we have chosen word for word, sentence for sentence, and consider it time well spent.
treatise should do more than this.

But a philosopnl.c

It should categorize and

search for the causes of things.
That he is an inheritor of the ideas above mentioned,
Proiessor Haldane himsel.t tells us in h.i.s letters to Arnold
Lunn and in several of his other works.
~s a child I was not brought up in the tenets
of any religion, but in a household where science
and philosophy took the place of faith. As a boy I
had very free access to contemporary thought, so
tbAt I do not today find Einstein unintelligible,
or Freud shocking. As a youth I fought through the
war, and learned to appreciate sides of l:urnan character with which the ordinary intellectual is not
brought into contact. As a man I am a biologist,
and see the world from an angle which gives me an
unaccustomed perspective, but not, I think, a
wholly misleading one.l

10
In 1931, at the request of Arnold Lunn, Professor Haldane agreed to an exchange of controversial letters on religion in its relation to science.

In October, 1935, these

letters were published under the title Science and the Supernatural. At the time of the publication of this work he was
professor of genetics at University College, University of
London.

He commands considerable authority in English

scientific circles, but, like many modern irreligious scientists who leave the boundaries of their fields, he attempts
to explain everything, especially religious and moral matters,
in terms of science, as witness his preoccupation with Darwinian evolution, his scoffing at miracles and religious
dogma, and his bete noire, the problem of evil coexistent
with a just God.

But W.s own words sufficiently categorize

him.
I have not sufficiently examined the grounds
on which I hold some of my opinions. Even had I
done so to the best of my ability I have no doubt
that I should be mistaken in many instances. However, in spite of this scepticism I think that I am
probably nearer to the truth than you.2
I do not now believe all that I have myself
written. And, on the whole, my beliefs are a good
deal more provisional tb~n I imagine yours to be.
Before you have done with me you will regard me as
a slippery customer, an unfair controversialist,
and a nebulous thinker. This last I am, because
(as I am well awe.re) the verbal and other symbols
which I employ in thinking are inadequate to descri
the universe.3

Mr. E.I.Watkin gives an example of this nebulous thinking:
Professor Haldane believes that the efficacy of

11
prayer as a means of obtaining Divine assistance
has been, if not actually disproved, at least rendered extremely unlikely by scientific experiment.
Professor Galton, he tells us, believing, probably
with truth, that more prayer is offered for
sovereigns and the children of the clergy than for
other classes of society, compared their longevity
statistics with those of others living under similar
conditions. He proved that their lives were on the
average slightly shorter. Therefore, concludes
Professor Haldane triumphantly, God does not answer
prayers.4
In all probability, my words and thoughts do
not correspond exactly with reality.5
I try to escape from such dilemmas (the relation of actions to character) by frankly admitting
that our ideas about most, if not all, things are
self-contradictory.6
I am prepared to admit the possibility that I
am nothing but a biologically and socially convenient fiction, that some hundreds of millions of
Buddhists, in fact, are correct in referring to the
"illusion of personal identity." In any case, our
words and other symbols are so inadequate to reality
that it seems likely that any statement which can
be made on any subject contains at least an element
of falsehood, unless, perhaps, it is a purely
logical statement.7
MacDougall believes in the immortality of the
soul, which I don 1 t.8
I am a part of nature, and, like other natural
objects, from a lightning flash to a mountain range,
I shall last out my time and then finish. This
prospect does not worry me~ because some of my work
will not die when I do so.~
I am willing to be called a secularist ••• as
conveying something more positive than the word
"infidel. "10
As a secularist and a biologist Haldane views everything
in its relation to scientific findings.

As a scoffer at

religious the supernatural is to him a myth.

th1n~
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I still assert that the creeds are full of
obsolete science.ll
Personally I regard the theory of transsubstantiation as a piece of pre-scientific chemistry.l
He scoffs at miracles,
But please do not ask me to investigate one.l3
My own intellectual attitude to miracles is
much the same as Hume•s.l4
Hume had said that
A miracle is a violation of the laws of Nature;
and as a firm and unalterable experience has established those laws, the proof against a miracle,
from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as
any argument from experience can be.l5
As a further demonstration of the propriety of placing
Haldane in the category of empirics and phenomenalists like
Hume, Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Kant and James, his ideas on
efficient causality follow.
The assumption is made that the cause contains
all the perfections of its effect. If this is so
there is no real novelty. If there is real novelty,
The First Cause is a matter of mainly historical
interest.l6
God is alleged to be a changeless being. Now,
when I influence the world by an act of the will,
this constitutes a change in me as well as in the
world. Hence the attribution of a series of acts of
will (not to mention incarnatl~n) to a changeless
being seems to be impossible.
Professor Haldane's metaphysical and religious standpoint may be further studied in his work Kant's Scientific
Thought and Possible \"!orlds, though even here he gives
nothing definite.

The efficacy of prayer can be scientificall

disproved, there is very little ground to believe in personal

,...,
------------------------------------------------------.
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immortality, we cannot tell whether or no there is a God.

On

the other hand, mechanism is adequate to explain tbe universe;
some form of idealism--to which Kantism is the least inadequat
approach made hitherto--is most probably the truest account
of it, and if the human mind may be extinguished at death, it
is quite as probable that it will be "merged into an infinite
mind or something analogous to a mind which I have reason to
suspect probably exists behind nature."l8
It seems evident from the above quotations that what has
been said by the various agnostics finds an echo in Haldane's
writings.

He is probably a greater scientist than those

named, and it is in the scientific field almost exclusively
that he finds fault with Christian and Catholic beliefs.

More

to the point in the present thesis, the professor, in rejecting a rational proof for the existence of God, rfghtly singles
out St. Thomas as his main target.
I have devoted a good deal of time to St.
Thomas' arguments, for two reasons. They are
probably the best of their kind. And you have
adopted the usual Catholic theory that they are
invincible. In an encyclical of 1879 Pope Leo XIII
wrote: "It is well known that there have not been
wanting heresiarchs who openly said that, if the
doctrine of St. Thomas could be got rid of, they
could easily give battle to other Catholic doctors,
and overcome them, and scatter the Church." I do
not regard St. Thomas as particularly difficult to
get rid of; but I do not harbor the illusion that
I shall scatter the Church, because it is not founded on reason, but on emotion. St. Thomas' philosophy is based on antiquated science and faulty
mathematics.l9
Professor Haldane is evidently more concerned with the

~·
------------------------------------------------------------------~
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science contained in St. Thomas' arguments, and, as will be
seen, with the physics and mathematics in the argument from
motion.

He either does not know or refuses to credit the fact

that the Qu1.nque

~

are metaphysical arguments, and, as

such, totally transcend the scientific findings of any age.
But, even though the metaphysical principles contained in
them sufficiently disprove the charges made against their
validity, much space will te given to the physical side of
the first argument in an attempt to prove, over and above
what is strictly necessary, the cogency of the Thomistic
argument from motion.

,...-

------------------------------------------------------------~
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CHAPTER III
The Possibility of a Rational Demonstration
Before entering into a demonstration of' the metaphysical
argument f'rom motion, we must meet the charges against the
rationality of the proofs made not only by Professor Haldane,
but also by the many modern ppilosophers we have named.
The "the existence of' God can be rationally proved is a
Catholic doctrine," is correct, and the Vatican Council has
defined what can be known of' God by the natural light of'
human reason.
The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches
that God, the beginning and end of' all th:1.ngs, may
be known for certain by the natural light of human
reason, by means of created things, "f'or tbe invisible things of' Him f'rom the creation of' the
world are clearly seen, being understood from the
things that are made" (Rom. I, 20); but that it
pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself'
and the eternal decrees of His will to mankind by
another, namely, the supernatural way.l
Canon I of this chapter reads:
If anyone shall say that the one true God,
our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by
the natural llght of human reason through created
things, let him be anathema.2
Hence, it is heretical to maintain, as do the atheists
and positivists, that there is no way by which we can arrive
at the knowledge of God, or to assert with the most advanced
traditionalists and fideists, that we can know God only
through revelation or by some positive teaching received by
tradition.

In fact, the Congregation of the Inde:x, in con-

demning fideism, required the Abbe Bautain, in 1840, &nd

1'7

Augustine Bonnetty, in 1855, to assent formally to the proposition (among others) that "human reasoning has the power
to prove the existence of God with certainty (ratiocinatio
cum certitudine probare valet)."

Furthermore, this body

declared:
The method employed by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other scholastics after them, does not
lead to rationalism, nor can it be blamed for the
fact that the contemporary philosophy of the schools
drifted into naturalism and pantheism. Hence no
one has the right to reproach these doctors and
teachers for having employed this method, especially
since they did so with the at least tacit approval
of the Church. 3
The Scholastics have always considered as erroneous the
opinion of those who denied the demonstrability, properly
speaking, of God's existence.

St. Thomas, Duns Scotus,

Suarez and others have qualified this opinion as erroneous
and manifestly false.
The falseness of this opinion (of those who
say that the existence of God is a tenet of faith
alone and cannot be demonstrated) is shown to us as
well by the art of demonstration, which teaches us
to argue causes from effects, as also by the order
of the sciences,--for if there be no knowable
substance above sensible substances, there will be
no science above physical science; as also by the
efforts of philosophersa directed to the proof of
the existence of God ••• ~
In these proofs, as Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange well points
out, there is no question of a scientific demonstration,
understanding by that term a process that does not go beyond
the data of observation and experience.

If reason tells us

that the objects of experience are not self-explanatory, but

18

need a cause to render them real and

intelligible~

and if

reason further shows that the cause must go beyond the limits
of observation and

experience~

then there exists a philo-

sophical or metaphysical demonstration--the demonstration
shown forth in the Quinque Viae.
The present tendency is to explain everything in terms
of science.

Any attempt to bring Thomistic cosmology into

relations with modern scientific advances will seem a ridiculous anachronism to those who identify philosophy with science
and who, like the contemporaries of Descartes and

Newton~

are convinced that fresh progress in the sciences necessitates
a new view of the entire universe.

And yet it is quite true

that the metaphysical principles of Thomistic cosmology were
valid and have remained unimpaired throughout the centuries.
Many an error and exaggeration would have been avoided in
scientific research and theory had these principles been kept
in view and followed.

Materialism~

dynamism, and pure

energetism would not now be plaguing science.
physical

principles~

These meta-

because they form part of tbe body of

principles and doctrines which constitute the cardinal points
not only of cosmology but of a harmonious and synthetic
philosophy like ThomiSm, are capable of guiding and unifying
the findings of present-day scientists.
There are solid grounds for asserting that th~
principles of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy
can be regarded as the presuppositions of the particular sciences with greater reason than can those
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of modern idealistic and positivistic philosophy
which either explains away the specific significance
of the individual sciences~ or conversely, allows
itself to be absorbed by them.5
Our philosophy of nature seems to the modern
mind to heve about as much to do with nature as have
the speculations of Kant or Hegel. And yet, Aristotle's theory of material energy is the same as
that us~d in modern physics, or more precisely, in
thermodynamics. The world of physics is deserting
Calileo and Newton and is going back to Aristotle
without knowing it.6
As Aristotle sbowed,7

the objects of the positive scien-

ces are essentially material and changeable, and consequently
reach only the fringe of intelligibility.

The intelligible

element found in these sciences is to be found in the fact
that they have recourse to the metaphysical principles of
causality, induction and finality.

In face, the certitude

which is properly termed scientific grows in proportion as
what o!'le affirms approaches nearer to the first principles
which constitute the very structure of reason--the principle
of identity implied in the most universal and simple of all
ideas, the idea of being, and the principles of contradiction,
causality and finality.
The demonstration of the existence of God must in itself
be more exacting than is the case in scientific demonstration.
Not only must it establish from observation the need of an
infinitely perfect cause, but must show whr it needs this
cause and no other.

It must not be hypothetical but conclus-

ive; it must of necessity flow from the highest and very first
of all our ideas, namely, that of being.

~----------------~
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Any demonstration of God's existence must not be and
cannot be

~

priori, i.e. from cause to effect, because the

--

proposition "God exists" is not per se evident for us.

---

We do

not know the divine essence such as it is in itself; we can
reach it only by means of positive analogical concepts which
reveal to us the traits it has in common with created things.
The demonstration, then, will have to be
from effect to cause.

~

posteriori, i.e.

To be a strictly metaphysical demon-

stration it must argue from the proper effect to the proper
cause, which means to the necessary and
solutely first cause.

i~nediate,

the ab-

Not in any series of accidentally

connected past causes must the original cause be sought, but
in the one in which there is an essential connection between
the causes and in which we eventually arrive at one which
must be the proper cause, without any further affirmation.
Modern agnostics, in contemning the intelligence, likewise impugn the validity of first principles.

Their denial of

reason's ability to establish the existence of God is the
logica.l conclusion to their premises, for the validity of
the metaphysical proofs stands or falls with the admission of
these first principles.

In meeting Haldane's charges against

the first argument, then, it is necessary to establish the
validity of these primary concepts, that we may not fall into
the error of presupposing that which we wish to pro ...re.
Traditional theodicy is conceived entirely from the
viewpoint of' being and the principles of being.

Eve:ty faculty,

~----------------------------2~1
according to St. Thoma.s,8

has a formal object to which it is

naturally ordained, which it attains first of all, and by
which it attains everything else.

The formal and adequate

object of the intelligence is being.

Our intelligence at

first knows the essence of sensible things in a very confused
manner, 1..mder the most general attribute of being.9
The first notion conceived by the intellect is
being, and thl8 notion of being is included in every
apprehension.
The intellect conceives being before aught else
as somethinG most known, and into being it resolves
all conceptfons.ll
This initial arid confused concept tells us little about
the constituent elements of tr.;e real, yet it comprises them
all down to their last determinations.

It is applicable to

all reality, whether actual or possible, present, past, or
future.

It is applicable to every grade of reality, even to

the angels, and to God Himself.

No affirmation is possible

without being; in fact, anyone who uses the verb "is" and make
an affirmation necessarily accepts the philosophy of being
with all its implications.

The :moderns, witL all their

categorical statements, seem to forget this.
All the first principles flow from this notion of being.
The first of these is the principle of contradiction, from
which, in turn, the other first principles readily follow.
The first indemonstrable principle which is
based on the notion of being and not-being is this:
the same thing cannot at once be affirmed and denied
On this principle are based all o:·ther principles .12
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The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith as self-ev1.dent principles to a teaching based on natural reason.
Among these principles there is a certa1.n order:
some are contained implicitly in others while all
are reducible to this one basic principle: The same
thing cannot at once be affirmed and denied.l3
The first and fundamental judgment in the ontological
order is a judgment of affirmation: being is; being: being.
This is the principle of identity.

It affirms that every-

thing is its own nature, that everything has a determined
essence.

The principle

£!

noncontradiction is a negative

formula of tl:e same principle: the same being cannot be and
not be at the same time and under the same formal aspect.l4
Ivioreover, there is no third thing between being and nonbeing;
being eith.er is or it is not.

The principle of identity

establishes the remote foundation .for tbe theistic arguments.
Multiplicity, change, imperfection have not in themselves the
reason of being.

Their sufficient reason must be sought in

One Who is pure identity, pure Being, pure actuality, pure
perfection, and Who by that very fact is transcendent and essentially distinct from the composite and changing world.l5
The proximate foundation of the theistic arguments is
the principle of sufficient reason,

~hich

may be proposed as

follows: everything must have a sufficient reason either in
itself or in another, i.e. if what belongs to it is or is
due to its essential constitution.

~ot

The existence of a con-

tingent being finds a sufficient reason only in an extrinsic,
necessary being; a means, which is not desired for its own

~---------------------------------------------------------2-3~
sake, derives its su:rficient reason :rrom the end for which it
is intended.

This extrinsic reason for being supplies the

basis for efficient and final causality.
The immediate foundation of the theistic arguments is the
principle of efficient causality.

To deny it, as do so many

of tbe moderns, and as Professor Haldane at least implicitly
in all his

ar~Jments

seems to, is to deny the principles of

sufficient reason and of contradiction, and ultimately of
being itself.

In fact, it is intellectual suicide and a condemnation to eternal silence,l 6 which the agnostics are not
logical enough to see.
Being is a transcendental--it transcends all the genera

and species and is not limited to any one of them.

It belongs

to every member of the hierarchy of beings without implying of
itself any of the limitations proper to each of ttem.

It has

the capability of being realized not only in the world of
sense-knowledge, but also in one transcending ours.

How do

we know that being is de facto realized in tb.e world, or that
God exists?

The multiple, limited, contingent, changeable

and imperfect things of this world cannot justify the presence
in them of being.

Since it cannot be doubted that they are,

we look for a cause of their being.

The only cause capable

of realizing the existence of all contingent things is One
which transcends them, which we call the supreme Being, Subsistent Being, the First Cause, God.
The theistic argu.nents are likewise all reduc-

r-----------------------------2~4
ible to being. If being as such did not dernand a
cause, we could easily dispense with God. Particular causes would sufficiently account for
particular effects. If from the latter we rise to
a First Cause, it is because being is contained in
a very real sense and special manner in each and
every one of them. Theodicy, which is the crown of
metaphysics, envisages God as the principle and
source of being. He is called Mover, Cause, Designer, etc., only insofar as the effects implied
by these titles are participations of being.
The
theistic arguments are five different ways of proving the existence of one and the same ~g.l7

~----------------------------------------------------2-5-.
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CHAPTER IV
The Traditional Argument and Haldane's Objections to It
Anaxagoras seems to have been the first to have formed
tbis argument from motion, when he asserted that the motion
of mundane things proceeds from the divine intellect:
~
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Plato. held that there are souls which move themselves
and

bod~es,

but that is is not demonstrable that God is the

motor immobilis.2

Thus he concludes to the soul of the world,

from which proceed movement in the world, and to the soul of
the sun, which in a wide sense he calls God.
The mainspring of Aristotle's argument is the proposition
that an ontological regress cannot proceed to infinity; whence
it follows that such a regress must terminate in an ultimate
mover which is itself unrnoved.3
In working out the details of his proof Aristotle is
chiefly concerned with motion in space--with local motion,
as the neo-Scholastics phrase it--and he is so because it is,
so he tells us, the primary form of motion.

None the less he

also takes into account qualitative and quantitative change,
which last manifests itself under the two forms of augmentation and diminution. In the third book of the Physics 4 he ineludes under the head of motion generation and

corruption~

But in the fifth book5 he narrows down his classification so

r
r
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as to exclude them.

St. Thomas notes this inconsistency,

but regards it as a mere matter of terminology.

For generat-

ion and corruption obviously involve both qualitative and
quantitative change, as well as local motion.

Moreover, in

-

the eighth. book of the Physics6 they are grouped with the
other kinds of motion which are taken together as forming a
common point of departure for the proof of a prime mover.
St. Thomas reconciles the positions of Plato and
Aristotle as to the prime mover by saying that Plato extends
the concept of motion to include any operation, and hence
was quite consistent in speaking of the source of motion as
self-moving, inasmuch as it possesses both knowledge and
desire; whereas Aristotle, in speaking of the prime mover as
unmoved, intended only to assert that God is not involved in
physical change, and did not mean to deny that intellectual
activity can be predicated of Him.7
The Thomistic proofs for the existence of God are
formulated in the Summa Theologica and in the S1mroa Contra
Gentiles.

In both works the proofs are substantially the same

they differ only in the wanner of their exposition.

In gen-

eral they are more succinct and simplified in the Sumoa
Theologica, since this work is intended for beginners, and
present the matter from a more metaphysical point of view.
The Sunrr.1a Contra Gentiles deals with the matter more fully,
from a physical viewpoint and from an appeal to sense experience.

This is especially true of the argument fron1 motion,
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which St. Thomas considers superior to the other four, as
being the simplest and the easiest to grasp.a
The Summa

Theo~ogica

sets out the proof from motion in

the following form:
It is certain--and our senses witness to the
fact--that there is movement in the world; everything that moves is set in motion by something.
Nothing, in fact, is in motion unless it be in
potency with regard to that toward which it is
moved; and nothing per contra moves anything except
as it is in act. To-iet a thing in motion means to
cause it to pass from potency to act. Now a thing
can only be brought from potency to act by something which is in act. For instance, it is heat in
act {for 'example, fire) which makes the wood, which
is only potentially hot, actually hot, and to that
extent, moves and alters it. But it is impossible
for a thing to be both in acj and in potency at the
same time in reference to the same things. Thus an
actually hot thing cannot at the same time be actually cold, but only potentially cold. It is therefore impossible for a thing to be, at the same time
and in reference to the same things, both mover and
moved, i.e. set in motion by itself. Whence we see
that everything that is in motion, is moved by
something else. If, on the other hand, that by
which a thing is moved, is itself in movement, the
reason is that it is, in its turn, set in motion by
some other mover, which is again moved by another
thing and so on. But it is impossible to regress
in this way ad infinitum, because, in that case,
there would oe no first mover, nor consequently
other movers, for the second mover imparts movement
only because the first set it in motion, as a stick
moves only because the hand imparts movement to it.
To explain movement it is consequently necessary to
regress to a first mover which is itself not set in
motion by anything, i.e. to God.9
The argument in the Summa Contra

Gentil~s

is taken over

directly from Aristotle:
Everything that is set in motion, is so moved
by something else. Now, it is e. matter of senseexperience tr~t there is movement; for instance,

r
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the movement of the sun. Consequently the sun moves
because something sets it in motion. But that
which sets it in motion is either itself set in
motion or it is not. If it is not, we have reached
our conclusion, viz. the necessity of positing an
immobile mover which we call God. If it is moved 7
there must be another mover that imparts movement
to it. Therefore we must either regress to infinity
or posit an immobile mover; now the regress to
infinity is impossible: consequently we must assume
a first inmobile mover.lO
In this proof, two propositions require to be established, first, that everything in motion receives motion from
some other thing

(~

quod movetur ab

~

movetur) 7 and,

second, that we cannot regress to infinity in a series of
things moved and moving

(~

datur regressus in infinitum).

Both of these propositions are amply proved by Aristotle and
included in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

We shall refer to them

later when we answer Professor Haldane's sweeping objections
to them.
With the argument thus set before us, here is the place
to detail Haldane's objections to the two propositions, in
order that we may see just what his difficulties are, and how
we may best answer him.
With a desire to exhibit some degree of fairness, the
Professor gives his version of the argument from motion.
St. Thomas brings forl:Vard five proofs in the
Summa Theologica, but cor.eentrates on tro first of
them--the argument as to the unmoved mover, in the
Summa Contra Gentiles •••
Some things move. Whatever is in motion is
moved by something else. Hence either there is an
immovable mover or an infinite series of things
which move others and are themselves moved. But
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this is impossible. So there is an immovable mover.
(The word movere, here translated "to move," was
used by mediaeval philosophers to denote other kinds
of change. However, St. Thomas was mainly concerned
with change of position, as shown by his rather unfortunate choice of the sun as the example of something which everyone would admit to be in motion.
I use the word "move" as the English e qui valent,
since it is u$.ed in the official translation by
Dominican monks.)ll
The argument thus summarized doesn't do it full justice,
though it may perhaps be straining a point to call it a
travesty, as Arnold Lunn does.l2

The big error in the

criticism given by Haldane is that he objects to them on the
ground that they are physical only.

His criticism in full

is given below.
Let us now examine the first argument, taken
from Aristotle. St. Thomas observes that two things
must be proved, namely, that whatever is in motion
is moved by another, and that it is impossible to
proceed to infinity in movers and things moved. In
my opinion both these propositions are false. The
first is part of Aristotle's physics, but Newton's
first law is as follows: "Every body continues in
its state of rest of uniform motion in a straight
line, except insofar as it may be compelled by force
to change its state." I do not wish to use Newton
as an authority, but his laws have been very extensively verified, and unless you are going to
contend that Aristotle was right and Newton wrong I
shall assume the opposite ••• It might be said that
even in Newtonian physics every moving body had at
some past time been set in motion by some other.
But this was not what St. Thomas meant. In his
argument against an infinite series of movers he
wrote that "every body that moves through being
moved is moved at the same time as it moves." Accor
ding to the Aristotelian physics the sun and planets,
for example, were actually kept in motion by the
primum mobile.l3
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The arguments against an infinite regress are
as follows (these relate to Aristotle's proofs
quoted by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles):
(a) If it is true, an infinite num'6er of bodies
must be in motion at once, vthich is impossible.
Why is it impossible, if there is an infinite number of movable bodies?
(b) If it is true, then in an infinite series of
movers "there will be no first mover, but all will
be intermediate movers, as it were. Therefore it
will be impossib:ls for any of them to move, and thus
nothing in the world can be moved."
Now if this argument is correct, we can apply
it to other series. A transposition of St. Thomas'
argl~ent reads, "If there are an infinite number of
points in a finite line traversed by a moving particle, then there will be no first point reached,
but all will be intermediate points, as it were.
Therefore it will be impossible for the particle to
start." Now this contains two fallacies. Firstly,
there are infinite series with a first D'!.ember. Thus
if we consider that portion of a line running east
and west which is not east of a given point nor more
tnan ten miles west of it, this segment contains
an infinite number of points; but there is a first
point, namely, tbe given one. Secondly, there are
series of points w:tth no first member, which can yet
be traversed. Sush are the series of points lying
west, but not more than ten miles west, of the given
point. For every member of this series is some distance west of the given point, and within this distance, however small, a still nearer point can be
found.
St. Thomas' argument, if it were logically
applied, would prove the impossibility of motion.
It had been used for this purpose by Zeno the
Eleatic.
(c) This is the same argument as (b), in reverse
order, depending on the alleged impossibility of an
infinite series of movers.
(d) If every mover is moved, this proposition is
either true in itself or accidentally. Suppose it
to be true accidentally, then it might be true that
none ever was moved, in which case there would be
no movement, which is absurd.
This argunent being false, I need not detail
the reasoning which proves that the above propositio
is not true in itself, and hence that there is an
i~novable mover.
The fallacy is, of course, that
the world might be such that some movers were
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necessarily moved, and others just happened to be·.
moved. In this case there would necessarily be some
movement, but it might perhaps only be accidentally
true that all movers are moved.l4
He (S't. Thomas) argued, starting from a body
in motion, namely, the sun, that its motion must be
due to a mover. Thence he argued back to an unmoved
mover, or unclll.anged changer. His \"lords, at least :J.n
the Summa Theologica, leave' it open whether he
thought that all the series of movers, from the sun
to God, were acting simultaneously or successively.
His argument is as valid in one case as in the other
Hence, I did not, in attacking it, make the
assumption least favorable to him, namely, that he
thought all the movers were simultaneous. I gave
him the benefit of the doubt, though quite aware
that he inclined to the opinion of Aristotle, which,
as I think, has been demolished by Newton. If,
however, you think that in order to prove St. Thomas
you must disprove Newton's view that a body in motio
continues in motion unless something stops it, I
shall be delighted to defend Newton.l5
Of course an infinite series does not help me
to get rid of dependence. Why should it? I have
never come across anything which did not depend on
something else, and I don't expect to ••• I quite
e.gree with Dr. Patterson that however long we trace
causes back "we are no nearer reachinf an ultimate
and self-explanatory cause of motion.
And however
long we go on counting we do not get any nearer to
a largest number, beQause there is no such thing.
Why should there be?lo
He (St. ThomAs) did not speak, like Professor
Patterson, of an ultimate and self-explanatory
source of motion. God is not self-explanatory, in
my opinion.l7
In Chapter II of this thesis we have set forth Professor
Haldane's ideas on efficient causality.
could not contain

~11

He argues that God

the perfections of created things be-

cause, in that case, there would be no novelty in the world.
Furthermore, if we attribute acts of will to God, He is not a
changeless being.

Thus he is led to conclude:
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You see that St. Thomas' arguments disprove
one another. He arrives at a certain theory about
God, and this theory is self-contradict~ry ••• The
correct conclusion from St. Thomas' chains of thought
seems to be as follows: Certain arguments tend to
prove the existence of a first cause. But if there
iS a first cause we cannot know what it is, or even
that it is a cause, or first. Hence these arg~~ents
contain a fallacy.
Many philosophers have come to this conclusion.
Thus Kant held that reasoning as to a first cause
inevitably led to antinomies.l8
To sum up, the argument for an immovable mover,
which was St. Thomas' main proof of the existence of
God, rests on two false premises. One, that whatever is in motion is moved by another, is bad science.
The other, that an infinite series of moves is impossible, is bad logic and bad mathematics.l9
Here, then, is the indictment in full.

A scientist of

the twentieth century calls St. Thomas to task for his thirteenth century physics and mathematics.
completely misread the argument.

Professor Haldane has

Nowhere does he acknowledge

the metaphysical character of the theistic demonstrations, but
claims that they fail by reason of their antiquated physics,
chemistry and mathematics.

So sweeping is his indictment of

this first proof that our best way of answering him is to
establish first its metaphysical character and then, insofar
as we are able, to meet the difficulties raised not only by
Professor Haldane but by most modern physicists as well against
physical or local motion.
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CHAPTER V

-- ---

--- --

Criticism of the Proof and of Haldane's Objections

--~-----

--~~~- -~-------

The argument from motion, or the kinesiological argument,
as it is called, is based on the dynamical aspect of finite
substances.

Of the five metaphysical proofs which St. Thomas

gives, he assigns to this the first place, as being the
plest and easiest to grasp.

sim-~-·

In modern times it has suffered

an eclipse owing to a belief that it depends upon a principle
which physical science has shown to be untenable.

As a matter

of fact, the prejudice is due not to any of the results which
physical science has achieved in recent times, but to an
erroneous philosophy of motion, introduced by Descartes, which
has widely affected current modes of thought.

A careful

consideration of the proof will show its apodictic character.
It is securely based on those fundamental first principles
which no physical discoveries can invalidate.

In Chapter II

we quoted from two modern Scholastic philosophers who are
firmly convinced that present-day science owes more to an
Aristotelico-Scholastic cosmology than it does to any of the
idealistic and positivistic philosophies which these scientist
theoretically profess.

Moreover, there is a steady trend

toward Aristotle which would undoubtedly surprise these men if
they took the trouble to read the Stagiri te.
But we must not try to validate the Aristotelian nor the
thirteenth century physics.

That would not only be unneces-
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sary but absurd.
sical order.

This argument is primarily in the metaphy-

Professor Haldane is not the only modern

scientist to be confused.

Professor A. Whitehead tells us:

The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aristotle's thought was enmeshed in the details of an
erroneous cosmology ••• l
In this argument we take the great and universal fact
of movement.

All things are in constant change.

Astronomy

sets forth the revolutions and various movements of stellar
bodies.

Geology explains the development of the earth.

logy is busied with the phenomena of growth.

Bio-

Physics and

chemistry reveal the molecular movements and the multiform
combinations of inorganic elements.

To take this fundamental

phenomenon as the basis of an argument is to appeal to an
obvious as well as to a metaphysical truth.

There will be no

question, then, about the fact of movement; as to the r1ature
of movement there has been, even from ancient times, a serious
controversy.

On this point Aristotle took issue with the

philosophers of his day, and this fact is the basis of much of
modern

p~losophy,

as

wit~ess

the Hegelian system, with the

teachings of which any treatise on the existence and attributes of God is brought into contact.
In ancient times Parmenides denied the fact of motion,
as in quite modern times did Herbart •
••• J.F.Herbart, qui motum fieri non posse his
argu.mentis ostendere studuit: 10 Id, quod movet1~
vel mutatur, fit aliud. 20 Mutatio, si qua fieret,
aut a causa externa aut a causa interna aut absolute
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i.e sine causa, esset. Sed nihil horum secum non
pugnat. Mutatio enim fieri nequit a causa externa;
nam nulla res agere vel pati potest nisi in se ipsa;
neque ita facere possemus, quin in processum in infinitum raperernur. Neque fieri potest mutatio a
causa interna; unde enim mutatio caperet exordia?
Accedit quod ita res una per oppositionem, quae inter Agere et Pati intercedit, dirimeretur. Neque
denique mutatio fieri potest absolute, i.e. sine
causa; nam ex uno ente non potest oriri multiplex
illa successionmn varietas, quae in qualibet
mutatione conspicitur.2
Heraclitus held the theory of perpetual motion in
material things.

The Hegelian system goes even further, teach

ing that all t.bings are in a perpetual state of becoming.

The

to fieri is the central point of Hegel's Idealistic system.
It is the medium between existing being and absolut"3 nothing.
Hence there is only a constant movement and evolution and no
repose.

Bergson and LeRoy in very recent times have been

enamored of the eternal flux idea, the
Such a contradiction between science and metaphysics
explains somewhat the disrepute into which the latter has
fallen.

If science finds it cannot harmonize with philosophy,

then out goes philosophy.

With philosophy goes religion--

hence the ease with which scientists discard the supernatural.
Eegelian philosophy is based upon a scientific and metaphysical error, and must be completely rejected. 3
Taken in its widest sense, then, this proof claims to
establish the existenooof a being immovable from every point
of view, and, therefore, uncreated; for in the case of every
created being there is at least the transition from non-being
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to beine, which conflicts witL the notion of absolute imrnobility.4

We are clearly not restricting ourselves to the realm

of local motion, whichSt. Thomas mentions as only one of the
many forms of motion.
our starting point.

The metaphysical notion of motion is
By motion is signified the process by

which a potency is realized.

It is not a form of being.

It

is something very different, namely, the transition from one
form of being to another.
chemical compound.

This is well illustrated in any

When sodium and chlorine are combined to

form sodium chloride, or cor:trnon table salt, the process of
change begins and ends with definite forms of being.

During

the process there is no natural entity capable of subsistence.
(It is true that this actualization may sometimes be arrested,
as in the case of a fertilized cell.

The result, however,

will not be a complete natural unit, but a frustrated beginnin
of such a unit.)

In the intermediate stages the final being

is in a state of becoming--it is fieri, not esse.

How well

Aristotle observed this is seen from the fact that he did not
include motion in his

n~ne

categories of being.

There are several very definite characteristics to be
noted in motion.
(in via

It is always on the road to realization

ad~).

So long as the process of realization is

passing from potency to act, and is never com,letely actualized, it is motion.

There is no motion in a being tbat never

leaves its starting-point, nor in that which has reached the
terminus of the actualizing process.

Hence Aristotle defined
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motion as "the act of that which is potential inasmuch as it
.:

is potential ( '1
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Next, motion is divisible in infinitum. Each part is just as
much motion as the whole, they are all different from each
other, and they are not interchangeable.

They are actuated in

a definite order, and each is necessary to the whole process.
From the observance of these two qualities we come to the
third, which is important to the understanding of the argument
to the unmoved mover.

We have seen tbat motion is at once the

result of the preceding and the producer of the succeeding
part.

At every stage of the motion process there is the

emergence of something new, and that in a continuous passage
from potentiality to actuality.

Here the indispensable first

principles play their part, and a denial of them is a denial
not only of this argument, but of every rational argument.
Becoming is the absence of identity.

It is the successiv

union of diverse, uninterchangeable, and new elements.

To say

that the successive union of diverse elements is unconditioned
is to deny the principle of causality.

To say that becoming

does not postulate the continuous operation and influx of a
cause (which preserves it in fieri, because motion is not bein
and hence cannot be preserved in

~)

is to deny the

of sufficient reason and to establish contradiction in the ver
heart of reality.

To say that a thing, devoid of a particular

form of being, is the cause in itself of the whole actualizing
process, is too absurd to need refutation.

In fact, motion,
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which is becoming, and undetermined, if it were the sole cause
of a being which is actualized, and hence determined, would
produce something greater than lay in its power.
would exceed the cause.

The effect

To affirm that one and the same thing

is at once undetermined and determined, potency and act, moved
and mover, is to deny the principle of contradiction.
is only one course left.

There

If the world is in motion, it must

be moved by something or someone other than itself--it needs
the continuous operation of a present and actual cause.
Thus motion is not a stable entity which can be produced
once and for all, and then needs only to be conserved in

~·

There must be a cause preserving the mobile in fieri, which
cause was expressed by the Schoolmen in the words: Quidquid
movetur ab alio movetur.
As regards this principle, Aristotle is very instructive:
We have now solved the difficulty, and shown
that motion is in the thing moved. For it is the
act of this latter effected by the agency of the
mover. And. the act of the mover is not something
other that it. For it must of necessity be the act
of both. For the "mover" is so termed by reason of
an active power which it possesses: and it is said
to be "moving," because it exercises that power.
But it exercises it in the thing moved, so that the
act of both is one and the same ••• s
Thus it follows, that wherever there is motion, there is
not only a body which is being moved, but also an agent
giz5.ng and productive of motion.

e~er

If there be motion, it is

just as impossible that there should be no agent as that there
should be no subject of the motion.
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By motion St. Thomas certainly meant

chan~e

not merely the passage of bodies through space.

of any sort,
Indeed, if we

were to occupy ourselves wholly with an analysis of physical
motion as though it were the main point at issue, we should
neglect the real metaphysical question which includes every
change in its scope.
only a partial one.

We should have a valid argument, but
Qualitative and quantitative alterations

come equally under the head of motion.
lectual activity.

So also does intel-

This last seems to point to an inconsis-

tency on the part of St. Thomas in his attempt to reconcile
Aristotle and Plato in regard to the prime mover.

Plato

equated motion with "any operation."
Accipbbat enim motum pro qualibet operatione.7
Aristotle, on the other hand, is said to have taken
motion in its strictest sense according to which it is the
act of something existing in potentiality as such.
Aristoteles enim propria accepit motum, secundum quod est acaus existentis in potentia secundum
quod huiusmodi.
Accordingly, Plato was justified in referring to God as
a self-mover, since for him movement did not involve corporeality; and Aristotle, on the other hand, was equally justified
in affirming that God is an urm.oved mover, since for him movement did involve both divisibility and corporeality. 9 So far
there is no inconsistency.

The discrepancy seems to arise

when St. Thomas refers to intellectual activity as itself a
form of movement.

But the inconsistency is only verbal.
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While in their precise and original sense the terms potential-

!!I

and motion have significance only in regard to physical

bodies in space, yet by a legitimate and natural extension
they may be applied to immaterial and non-spatial entities
such as the hu.L1an mind.

Thus in the Sunnna Theologica we read:

To be a subject and to be changed pertain to
matter because it is in potentiality. Accordingly
just as the potentiality of intellect is other than
the potentiality of primary matter, so also the
reason for being a subject and for undergoing change
is different in the one case from what 5.t is in the
other. ?or the intellect is subject to knowledge,
and is changed from ignorance into knowledge because it is in potentiality with respect to the
intelligible species.lO
·
It 1s clear, then, that for St. Thomas, the concepts of
potentiality and motion, taken in the widest sense, were
applicable to mind, inasmuch as it is subject to change; and
that, consequently, he was justified in regarding mental
activity as one of the presuppositions of the argument from
motion, since the latter is based on these concepts.

Fr.

Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., has this to say on the matter:
Le principe 1 quidquid movetur ab alio movetu~,'
loin de rep£ser sur une image spaciale, repose sur
la nature meme du deYen!r, rendu intelligible en ...
fonction, non pas de l'etre corporal, mais de l'etre
objet formel de 1 1 intelligence. Aussi ~ette motion
et ce principe peuvent-ils s'appliquer a un de~enir
qui n'a rien de spacial, comme celui de volonte.ll
Thus St. Thomas' argument is founded upon his conceptions
of actuality and potentiality, and of the relation of one to
the other.

The potential is that which does not yet exist,

but which is capable of existing as the result of the action
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of an efficient cause.

Indeed, this is one of the foundation-

stones of Thomistic philosophy, and is vital for the system.
Cum potentia et actus
libet genus entis.l2

divic~nt

ens et quod-

The very conception of the potential is derived from our
experience of the actual, and as a matter of fact we observe
in the generation of the members of a species that the potential is the result of a prior actuality.

Furthermore, the

potential, inasmuch as it is contingent and therefore capable
both of existence and non-existence, implies in its very conception that which exists by itself and of necessity.

More-

over, since for St. Thomas motion is equivalent to change,
the assertion that the actual is prior to the potential is
equivalent to the proposition Quidquid movetur ab alio
movetur.
Why, we may ask, did St. Thomas in the
Gentiles lay such stress on local motion?

Surr~a

Contra

Dr. Patterson gives

several reasons:
In the first place local motion is the cause of
quantitative and qualitative change in physical
things, and in the second place, if mental operation
are included in the definition of motion, the first
argument is practically identical with the third, as
the same principle is involved in both. In order
to keep them at all distinct it is necessary to lay
stress upon physical motion.l3
There has been, it is true, some difficulty in keeping
the first three arguments apart.

The same general principle

of sufficient reason or causality is involved, but each has
a different starting-point.

St. Thomas stressed local motion
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chiefly because Aristotle had done so, but he certainly did
not found his argument on local motion alone, as is clear from
the wording of the argument.
Verum est utique s. Thomam l.c. propositurum
argumenturn dicere:. 'et sensu constat aliqua moveri
in mundo.r Sed to et manifestat aperte illum non
ex solo motu corporiS argumentum ducere, sed ex
omni motu.l4
Since there are adversaries who have, on the one hand,
denied local motion, and some, on the other hand, who hold onl
local motion, and that without recourse to a primus motor
immobilia (as does Haldane), it is necessary to give more than
a little space to the argument from local motion.
The argument from local motion was first proposed by
Aristotle and further developed by St. Thomas in the Summa
Contra Gentiles.

Suarez, however, rejects this

proo~

as

limited in range and lacking in strength.

But, as Fr. Driscol

says, "Suarez reasons from a peculiar kind

o~

and betrays the undeveloped condition

o~

local motion

physics at the time."

Suarez concludes his treatise:
Igitur ex solo motu coeli nulla est s~~iciens
via ad huiusmodi demonstrationem conficiendam.l6
But what Suarez is

a~ter

is a metaphysical

proo~,

as Fr.

Nolan notes,17 and hence he is not an adversary o~ this thesis,
for he would certainly zrant the physical value of the argument from local motion.

Nee-Scholastic writers like Cardinal

Satolli, Fr. Pesch, Abbe Farges and Pere Garrigou-Lagrange
have examined the .facts and laws revealed by the physical
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sciences, and by their vindication of Aristotle's physical
postulates of motion have demonstrated conclusively the
vali:dity of this argument.

Speaking directly against

Descarte~

and his followers, whose physics of motion will later be
examined, Garrigou-Lagrange says:

,

~

Que le ~ouvement une fois~donne a un corps se
continue indefinimeiJt, c'est la une fiction commode
peut~etre pour rep~esenter certaines relations
mathematiques ou mecaniques en astronomie, mais
philosophiquement tres contestable.l8
Physical science explains the phenomena of motion by
attraction and repulsion, which it defines as the invisible
power in nature which tends to draw bodies toge-::-ther or to
repel them.

The law.-formulated by Newton-- a body attracts

another body in the direct ratio of the squares of the masses
and the inverse square of the distances--is a law that holds
universal sway throughout the material world.

Astronomy in

the stellar bodies, Physics and Chemistry in the molecules of
bodies, enunciate this law.

But while the fact is recognized,

its nature is disputed.

~1echanists,

The

following Descartes,

treat motion as something added to a fully actualized entity-no passage from potency to act.

In metaphysics it is on the

contrary the passage to actualization

(~ ~ ~).

Descartes

treated motion as a state; metaphysically, it cannot be treatec
as a state, because motion is essentially transient.

He con-

tended that motion passed. from one body to another; but motion,
not being a complete entity, cannot iJe handed on.

All tl1Rt is

possible is that the force which generates and maintains
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motion in one body should generate a second motion in another.
Were Descartes correct in his hypothesis, the proposition
Quidquid
--------

-- ----

movetur ab alio movetur would have to be abandoned in
~~~~

the case of local motion.
The Dynamists, on the other hand, following Leibniz,
maintain that matter is not purely passive, and they appeal to
ordinar;~r

observation and scientific experiment as

matter an active element.

re~realing

in

Matter possesses in itself the

power to act upon matter, and the conclusion is that a
primordial mover or initial cause of movement is unnecessary.
It is a peculiar fact that this argument of the Dynamists,
contrary to their contention , involves the necessity of a
communication to matter of motion from some source, which we
call the prime mover.
We have seen how Professor Haldane and other modern
scientists reject the two propositions of this argument on the
ground that they are inextricably bound up with Aristotelian
and medieval science.
In my opini.on both ••• propositions are false.
The first is part of Aristotle's physics ••• I do not
wish to use Newton as an authority, but his laws
have been very extensively verified, and unless you
are going to contend that Aristotle was right and
Newton wrong I shall assume the opposite,l9
Does the principle Quidquid movetur
conflict with Newton's first law?

!£

alio movetur

This law states that a

body in a state of motion persists in that state unless it is
subjected to the action of some external force.

It would
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seem to follow the.t a body once put in motion does not need
an agency for continuing the motion--that a body once started
would go on of itself.

The example of the billiard ball is

the one most frequently advanced.

Once the cue has imparted

motion to the ball, where is there an external force to continue this movement?

Is it not sufficient to say that the

motion once imparted is the explanation of all subsequent
motion, and that the ball eventually comes to rest by the
friction of the cloth and the resistance of the atmosphere?
Certainly, a continued application of an external force is
not evident to the senses, but we can argue to its necessity
from the impossibilities involved apart from it.
If the efficient cause of the motion is not external,
two hypotheses are possible.

The sufficient cause of the

effect is either to be found in the moving body itself, or in
its past motion.

Suppose it to lie in the body's past motion.

We are dealing with actual motion for which an actually
operative cause is necessary.
exist.

The past motion does not novr

But what does not now exist cannot be actually

operative.

The past motion was necessary that the body be

able to advance to where it now is.
it is

t~e

Its job is finished--

movebat, the necessary antecedent in all motion.

What does not exist cannot possibly produce the new effect
successively brought into being as the moving body advances.
The other hypothesis, namely, that the sufficient cause
is to be found in the moving body itself, is more difficult
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to answer.

You cannot, of course, say that the ball is the

reason of its own motion.

This would say nothing more than

that the reason why it moves is that it is in motion--which
answers nothing.

Certain recent Scholastics have revived an

ingenious hypothesis which at first sight seems good, but upon
closer examination exhibits certain faults.

Thms theory,

proposed by the old Scholastics and advanced by the NeoScholastics, Frs. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P~Oand Pesch, S.J.,21
states that the cause which

co~nunicates

motion to a body

puts in that body a new quality--impetus or impulsus--which
produces local motion so long s.s the motion endures.
the impetus is exhausted, the motion ceases.

When

Fr. Joyce, S.J.,

attacks this theory with rather close reasoning, which we
give in full:
(1) Unless we are prepared to deny all validity
to the first law of motion, we must admit that if a
body is once set in motion, this movement would
never cease, were it not for the action of impeding
forces; as regards duration it would be infinite.
Yet a corporeal quality which is a principle of
movement without end appears to involve a sheer
contradiction. An accident is necessarily proportioned to the substance which it q·ualifies and
in which it inheres. But according to this hypothesis, a finite substance is the subject of a
quality, wh:tch in one respect at least, is infinite.
(2) Further, even if this be supposed possible,
another difficulty presents itself. The inherent
impetus must constantly produce new effects; for, as
we have pointed out, the parts of any given motion
differ from one another, occurring, as they do, in
a definite order, the previous stages being prerequisites to the production of each subsequent one.
But it is manifest that the same quality cannot be
continuously modifying its eff~ciency unless it is
undergoing change itself. We have, in fact, merely
shifted the difficulty from the motion to the
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alleged quality which produces it. We must provide
an explanation for the change in the quality.
{3) Again: the impetus, if it exist, is actually
operative, and in consequence not indeterminate but
fully determined. Yet we are required to regard thi
fully det~rmined q1J~li t:y as being a principle of
motion which is ind,'-ifferently of any velocity and
of any direction. According to the laws of motion
a body in constrained motion will leave its path
and fly off at a tangent at whatever point of its
course the constraint is removed. Now there is no
need that the constraint should be due to a single
force acting from one centre. Successive forces
may have been brought to "bear upon the body from
widely different quarters. But, if we accept the
theory in question, it is reserved for the last of
all to determine the velocity and the direction of
the effects of every one. Such a result seems
wholly irreconcilable with reason.22
Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange explicitly states that the quality
of impetus must be finite, and of necessity cannot persevere
to infinity.

But, in so speaking, he implicitly denies

validity to the first law of motion, which does not seem to
be so easily laid aside.

There are others, as Gredt,23 who

hold that the quality of impetus once received cannot be
destroyed or remitted: whence the motion will endure in
aeternum unless checked by some external object.
seems to have refuted both these opinions.

Fr. Joyce

There is a third

theory, which, until a better happens along, presents a good
e.xplana tion. Fr. Hoenen, s. J. 24 advances the hypothesis
that motion perseveres because of the continuous action and
reaction of the ether.

Fr. Boyer, S.J.25 is of the same mind.

Everyone is agreed that an external force is needed in
the case of motion starting from rest.

Likewise, it is

uni veJ•sally admitted that an external force is needed ante-
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cedently to all changes in the rate of movement and of all
deviations from a straight line, even when these
law.

confer~

to

Would it not be curious if an external agent were

required for the maintenance of motion in an ellipse, for
instance, or in a parabola, but not in a straight line?

Does

the fact that Newton posited uniform motion necessarily
indicate the exclusion of external agency considered necessary
for changes of the rate of motion?
Only in the single hypothetical case of absolute uniformity of movement in a stBaight line can
Newton and Aristotle be made to appear to contradict each other. But what would be the reality
answering to our idea of a body so moving? It would
be a body now, for the moment, here, but with a
definite and energetic potency to move away: nothing
more. Motion, as such, does not, and cannot exist
as a whole. But the potency manifests its reality
by continuously passing into the act of movement,
without ceasing to be potential. The continuous
transition means continuous external agency. To
say that a body must move because it can move would
be absurd. When-n6Wton;-therefore, proceens-in the
second part of his First Law to declare that "a body
in motion will continue to move uniformly in a
straight line unless acted upon by an external force'
he should be taken to exclude only a certain class
of external agencies, those, viz., which he calls
"forces." 0 therwise he is in plain contra.d:tction,
not only to Aristotle and St. Thomas, but also to
common sense.26
We are driven then to the conclusion that all motion
requires the continuous action of an external force to explain
its persistence, and that without such agency the motion must
cease.

When Aristotle and St. Thomas laid dmvn the principle

~uidquid

movetur ab alio movetur they did not make a stab in

the dark, but had weighty reasons for their thesis.

And
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Newton, to the chagrin of Haldane and other anti-Scholastics,
does not go beyond this principle.

The fact is, be did not

go as far as Aristotle and St. Thomas.

He did not deny that

the uniform motion itself is due to an agency ab extra, but
merely that it is produced by an agency belonging to that
category of agents which he denominated "external forces.••
Does the fact that Newton used the plural term "forcest•
contradict our single prime mover?

Not at all.

It is a fact

of physics that a plurality of forces is brought to bear on
a moving body, but it is likwise evident that these forces
coalesce into a single motion.

It is a philosophic truth

that when many agents are employed in the execution of a work
which bas a true unity, the work must be attributed to the
principal agent which uses the others instrumentally.

Then

we must conclude that the phenomenon of local motion reveals
the existence of two orders of movers, the lower of the two
being the order stressed by Newton.

It may be true, as we

quoted Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange above, and as Fr. Nolan observes,
that Newton's law is an hypothesis suggested by the facts,
and cannot be proved experimentally.

Fr. Joyce, however,

who has gone into the matter at length, prefers to call it
Ua

logical abstraction based on a wide ind.uction.tt2'7
Thus Newton's first law as manifested in external

phenomena provides the most cogent evidence for the truth of
our thesis.

Either there exists a higher mover or multi-

plicity can be the source of unity.

Haldane's remark, then,
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that the first part of St. Thomas' thesis is "bad science,"
is quite sadly beside the mark.
V/hat is that agency which even Newton's law demands?
We may conclude this first proposition of the thesis with the
words of Fr. Rigby, S.J.:
The agency required is or a higher and more
universal order than that to which mechanical
forces belong. It transcends the possibility of
measurement in terms of time and space. It is
continuously at work in moving bodies, reducing and
tending to reduce the manifold to unity, the variab
to uniformity, and that which is liable to fail to
indefectibility; in one word, reducing potential! ty
to act, and so establishing and crowning the results
achieved by the agency of material things.28
Non datur regressus in infinitum.
In this second part of tl. . e argument we see more clearly
still the necessity of the concepts of act and potency, and
hence the validity of the metaphysical argument.

The funda-

mental conception of the whole thesis is that the potential
cannot per

~

pass into actuality, for this would say that the

non-existent can be the cause of the existent.

In other

words, were the potential capable of becoming actual of itsel:r
it would be its own cause, which is to say that it existed
before it began to exist--an evident absurdity.

Consequently,

we must posit the existence of some other entity, which,
itself wholly actual, is capable of being and acting as a
cause, and through its ae;ency the passage from potentiality
to actuality must be accomplished.

This entity must either be

eternal and changeless, or is itself likewise in motion.
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According to the first we have reached the primus motor
i~~obilis--God;

according to the second we must posit a third

entity which in its turn must act as a cause.

And so on

indefinitely.
An infinite regress, however, is impossible.

Were the1•e

no prime mover, but only a series of secondary agents, there
could be no motion.

For a secondary agent cannot per !! pass

from potency to act, as we have shown.

Its activity from

moment to moment and during each successive phase of movement
is due to the influx of a higher cause.

But if all the causes

were secondary, and there were no prime mover--the sufficient
reason for its own action--no motion would ever arise.

We

must bear in mind, however, that the priority of the unmoved
mover is a logical priority, not a temporal one. St. Thomas
saw this distinction as necessary to the discussion of the
question whether the world were created from eternity or no.
in his

Con~entary ~Peter

Lombard's Sentences, he says:

Quod eundem effe c tum praecedere causas infini tas
per se, vel essentialiter, est impossibile; sed
accidentaliter est possibile; hoc est dictu, aliquem
affectum de cuius ratione sit quod procedit a causis
infinitis, esse impossibilem; sed causas illas
quarum multipllcatio nihil interest ad affectum,
accidit effectui esse infinitas. verbi gratia, ad
esse cultelli exigunt1~ per se aliquae causae moventes, sicut faber et instrumentum; et haec esse
infinita est impossibile, quia ex hoc sequeretu~
infinita' esse simul actu; sed quod cultellus factus
a quodam fabro sene, qui multoties instrumenta sua
renovavit, sequitur multitudinem successivam instrwnentorum, hoc est per accidens; et nihil prohioet
esse infinita instrumenta praecedentia istum culte!J..
lum, si faber fuisset ab aeterno.29
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Thus there is nothing contradictory in the conception
of an infinite number of secondary causes succeeding each other
in tu1e.

In fact, St. Thomas clearly saw the impossibility

of disproving it philosophically.

This is not to say that he

believed in the actual existence of such a series, for this
would be to hold the eternity of the world, and to depart from
the teaching of the Church and Revelation.

St. Thomas was an

innovator in many phases of his philosophy, and never more so
than in this point.

And, like all innovators, he was vehement-

ly attacked for his daring teachings.

But, though he held it

illegitimate to argue to the existence of God from the supposed
necessity of a prius to the temporal series, his contention
was that every causal series, whether temporally finite or
infinite, is inherently contradictory unless regarded as
dependent upon an ultimate cause which is not in time at all.
In any such series each member is moved by its predecessor, and
this in turn by the member previous to it; and though we proceed in this manner to infinity, we are no nearer reaclung an
ultimate and self-explanatory source of motion.
Professor Haldane rejected this second proposition bn the
ground that it was bad logic and bad mathematics.30

He re-

jects one after the other the four proofs given by Aristotle
a~d

included by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, as we

have seen in Chapter IV.

"Why,tt he asks, "is it impossible

for an infinite number of bodies to be in motion at once, if
there is an infinite number of movable bodies?tt3l

But that is
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precisely the point.
bodies?

Is there an infinite number of movable

Haldane makes a gratuit9us assumption, which Aristotle

and St. Thomas saw to contain a contradiction.
If you reg:r•ess ad infinitum in the series of
things mo11ed and moving, you must assume an infinite
number of bodies, for e7erything that is in motion
is divisible and consequently a body. Now, every
body which moves and is moved, is in motion simultaneously imparting movement. Hence, all this
infinite number of bodies which impart movement
because themselves set in motion, must move simultaneously, if one of them moves. But each of them
must, as it is in itself a finite body, move in a
finite time, therefore the infinite number of bodies
moving simultaneously, must be in motion in a finite
time. But this is impossible. It is therefore impossible to regress ad infinitum in the series of
things moved and moving.
Moreover, the impossibility of an infinite
nmnber of bodies being in motion in a finite time,
is proved by Aristotle in this way: the thing that
eives and the thing that receives motion must be
together, as can ue shown inductively by reviewing
all the kinds of movement. But bodies can be
together only by continuity or contiguity. Since
the1•efore all the things moired and moving are
ne0essarily bodies, they must form, as it were, a
single moving object, the parts of which are in
contiguity or continuity. And thus a single infinite thing would have to be in motion in a finite
time--a pro~osition which Aristotle r'aS proved to be
impossible.32
The second argument, showing the impossibility of an
infinite regress, summarized by Professor Haldane and quoted
in Chapter IV of this thesis, reads as follows in Aristotle:
If a series of things moved and moving are
a:::rangecl in order, i.e. if they form a series in
which each thing gi~1es movement to the next, it is
inevitable that, if the first mover disappears or
ceases to move, none of the following things will be
either moving or moved: it is in fact the first move
that imparts the power of movement to all the others
Now, if we deal with an infinite series of things
moving and moved, there will be no first mover and
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all the things will function as intermediate movers.
Consequently, in the absence of a first mover,
nothing will be moved and there will be no movement
in the world.33
As we saw, Haldane finds fault with this reasoning by
bringing in e:x9.I!J.ples of infinite series of points on given
lines.

Thus, says Haldane, professing to follow the reason-

ing of St. Thomas and Ar1$totle, a moving particle attempting
to traverse this infinite series of points would be unable
to reach the first point, but a.ll would be intermediate points
Hence there would be no movement.

Since there are infinite

series of points, the argument is absurd.34

Arnold Lunn

rightly accuses his correspondent of confusing the infinite
divisibility of a continuous line with the possibility of an
j_nfinite number of real changes in real entities.35

Haldane

notes other infinite series of the mathematicians, saying that
they are cownon and easily handled.

As a parting thrust, he

accuses the Scholastics of founding their first four arguments
for the existence of God on the objection they felt to infin:lt
series. 36
That St. Thomas felt any objection to infinlte series in
his proof of the existence of the Unmoved. Mover is only partly
true, and is quite beside the point.

He does not argue that

an infinite regress is impossible, but that an infinite regres
does not get rid of contingency and dependence.

In fact, he

contended tr...a t it is entirely :I.llegi tima te to argue to the
existence of God from the supposed necessity of a prius to the
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temporal series, as was noted above.

In the arguments against

an infinite regress there is no reference to any beginning of
movement in time.

They merely establish that in the universe

as actually given, movement, as actually given, would be unintelligible without a .First Mover communicating it to all
things.

Thus nothing would have toJ:bB.nged in the proofs if

the false assumption of the etel"nity of movement were ad'111tted.

St. Thomas espressly states this in the Sunnna Contra
Gentiles. 37 Catholic dogma teaches that the world vvas
created in time, but St. Thomas was firmly convinced that
this fact could not be proved philosophically.

It would have

been very easy for St. Thomas to establish this first proof'
had he started from this fact of Revelation, for everything
that is produced requires a cause originating the new thing,
since nothing can· transfer itself' from potency to act, from
non- being to being.

Thus, in giving preferen.ce to the

assumption of the eternity of the world and of movement, he
took tr..e more difficult way, and, in proving his thesis,
a fortiori proved it on the hypothesis of a universe and movement which had a beginning in time.
St. Thomas, then, admits the ir:1posslbility of disproving
the e.:xistence of inf:tni te sertes in time wt th the aid of
reason alone.

But such a series, if it really exists, cannot

te actually infinite, that is, per !! and essentla.lly.
instance, the manufacture of a knife demands a

movir~

For
cause#

i.e. other instruments; tbese instruments, in turn, demand a

r
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cause, the 'vorkman who makes them; the workman also demands an
efficient cause.

Hence there is no proceeding to infinity in

such mcv1.ng causes.

If Professor Ealdane were to demand that

his infinite series be actually existent, as he seems to
demand, he would involve himself in an absurdity.

St. Thomas

did say that there was nothing repugnant in the concept of an
infinite series of accidentally subordinate movers which are
only instruments, for example, in the hands of a workman.38
But the point of the whole argument is the necessity of getting rid of contingency in such a series.

You may argue as

long as you like that the hands of a watch are moved by the
spring, the spring by a wheel, that wheel by another, and so
on ad infinitum, but you never get rid of contingency--you
never give a sufficient reason for the movement.

Contingent

beings have not in themselves the reason why they should
exist rather than not exist, why they should move rather than
not move.

In the absence of a necessary cause or mover they

simply would not be or move.

Hence, the irritated remark of

Haldane: "of course an infinite series does not help me to
get rid of dependence.

Why should i t?tt39 is not the least of

his absurdities.
Professor Gilson, paraphrasing St. Thomas, gives the
reason why an infinite regress at tr,e present moment when we
consider the universe, would be an absurdity.
The reason is that the causes, o~ the series
of which we argue, are hierarchically arranged; i.e.
that, in the assumption on which the prDof from the
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first Movez• rests, everything that is in motion is
given motion by a moving cause, superior to it, and
which consequently is the cause both of its own
movement and of its moving pow·er. What the super•ior
cause has to account for, is not only the movement
of the individual thing of any degree (for another
individual of the same degree would suffice to explain it, as one stone moves another stone), but the
movement of the whole species. It is true that,
ta~ing our standpoint within a species, we see without difficulty the sufficient reason of the individuals or of the movements in question, once the species
is given; but each individual or each moving cause,
having ~ hypothesi rece:tved from another its nature
and power of movement, can no longer be considered
as being itself the cause of its nature or its power.
But the 9roblem presents itself in the same manner
for each individual of the species under discussion,
since, for each, the nature defining it, has been
received from outside. The sufficient reason for
the efficacy of the individuals must therefore be
sought outside or above the species.40 Consequently
we must either suppose that whatever receives its
nature, is at the same time the cause of it and
tl~refore the cause of itself--which is absurd; or
that everything which acts by virtue of a nature
received, is only an instrumental cause, leading back
through superior causes, to a first cause.41
Having found fault with the second of Aristotle's proofs
against an infinite regress, Professor Haldane logically dismisses the third, since it is only the second in reverse order.
Aristotle's words are lucid enough, and, joined with the
reasoning just given in the second proof, should sufficiently
answer the objection brought against this third one.
We begin with tbe superior term and argue thus:
The intermediate moving cause cannot impart movement,
unless there be a primary moving cause. But in an
infinite regress of a series of moved and. moving
things, all are at the same time moved and moving.
Therefore only intermediate moving causes exist, and,
s1nce there is no primary moving cause, there will be
no moven1ent in the wol.. ld; unless, indeed, we should
ever observe an axe or saw operatj_ng without the
action of the carpenter.42
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These~

then~

are the proofs by which Aristotle and St.

Thomas establish the second proposition and the existence of a
first imrnobile mover.
another

argument~

mover is reached

After these three there is included

by which the same conclusion to the immobile
indirectly~

namely~

by showing that the

proposition (implicitly contained in the first argument) "Whatever imparts motion is set in motion by another" is not a
necessary proposition, i.e. one in which the predicate is contained in the very notion of the subject and the truth of
which is absolute and universal.

Haldane contends that "the

world might be such that some movers are necessarily moved,
and some just happened to be moved.

In this case there would

necessarily be some movement, but it might perhaps only be
accidentally true that all movers are moved."43
seems to have lost the point of this
disprove an infinite regress.

argument~

The professor

which is to

Since this part of the argument

is given at great length in the Summa Contra Gentiles,44 it
will suffice to summarize it here.
If the proposition "Whatever imparts motion is set in

l11.0-

tion by a nothern is true only accidentally, then it is possible
that none of the things which impart movement are themselves
in

motion~

Therefore~

a proposition that is denied by all thinking men.
if it is possible that nothing is in

motion~

sible that there is no longer anything that imparts
and hence no movement.
accidentally.

it!s pos

motion~

The proposition is thus not true

r
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An impossibility results if we say that the proposition is
true necessarily.

For thus the mover may receive either a

motion of the same kind which it imparts, or a motion of a
different kind.

If it receives a motion of the same kind, it

follows that everything that

pro~uces

a change, is itself

changed, everything that heals is itself
evidently impossible.

~ealed,

etc.

This is

On the. other hand, if the mover receives

a movement of a different kind, it would follow, since the
number of kinds and forms of movement are finite, that a regress ad infini tu...rn would i)e impossible.
Some scientists have argued that motion in a circle does
not require a first mover.

They argue that one molecule on

a circle can move a second, the second a third, the third a
fourth, and so on until the last of the series moves the first,
w~ereupon

the process is repeated.

had a beginning or it did not.

But, either the movement

If the former, then our argumen

is granted and we have a prime mover.

If the movement had not

a beginning, then we must a&nit that the first molecule was at
the same time in a state of motion and in a state of repose.
It is in motion because it moves

t~e

second molecule; it is in

repose because 1 t is moved by the last molecule.

r=ere

-.,;e

are

face to face with a contradictlon, and the conclusion is forced
upon us that there exists an ezternal first mover.45
i.:odern scientists have conceived motion as relative to a
closed system, understanding by that term a system of bodies
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and forces so ordered that it may be considered as an integral
whole, prescinding from all forces external to it.

Viewed

absolutely it may be undergoing no transference in space.

But

this hypothesis cloes not affect the Aristotelian argument,
since relative motion necessarily involves absolute moticn.46
From all these arguments we can readily see that all
move~ent

necessarily implies a mover other than itself, that

as long as there is motion there is an efficient cause producing

t~at

motion, and that however far we regress in things

moving and moved we never arrive at a sufficient explanation
of movement unless we posit a first in

t~e

series.

That this

Prime Mover must be itself unmoved flows directly from the
impossibility of an infinite regress.

That the Aristotelian

and Thomistic argur1ent contains no faulty logic seems to be
evident, and as to the charge of "bad mathematics," this is
equAlly absurd, for, granted the metaphysical correctness of
the argument, it cannot contradict the principles of mathematics.
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CHAPTER VI
The Primus Motor Immobilia
It may be objected that the argument from motion does not
conclude to the existence of God, but merely to a flrst mover
unmoved.

Strictly speaking, the objection has some validity.

St. Thomas says in the Summa Theologies. that, if we speak of
a first Mover not set in motion by anything else, e"Teryone
wi.ll understand that we mean God.l

He did not expect us to

accept this conclusion as pure and simple evidence: we shall
get the full proof when all the Divlne attributes which hur.:an
reason can apprehend from this notion of a first inunobile
I•i.over art} developed.
As we saw from the proof, the primus Motor immobilia is
really a mover, by which is understood an efficient cause
which reduces a movable oeing from potency to act.

It is

inunobile not in the sense that it lacks activity, but in the
sense that it moves without being moved, i.e. without receivin
any perfection toward which it is said to move, and that it is
not in potency to receiving any real act.
gette cause premiere, nous la disons irn..11obile
assurement, mais seulement en ce sens qq 1 elle n'est
pas mue par un autre, qu 1 elle est premiere ab~olu
ment dansc~rora:re; en d'autres termes, l'idee
d 1 1m~obi~ite ici qe·fait que nier absolument toute
passivite, c 1 est-a-dire sous forme positive, qu 1 elle
a.f~irme dans le premier moteur universe~ une
plenl tude exclusive de tou te privation.
It is first ontologically, or the efficient cause for
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which no other cause is required, and from which proceed as
from the supreme self-sufficing principle both the motion itself and ultj_mately the whole series of movers.
From this notion of the immobile prime mover we can
deduce more than sufficient attributes to prove that the notio
is predicable only of God.
1. The prime mover is pure act, i.e. there is nothing
potential in it.

The argument has already excluded all

potentiality in the order of action.

The prime mover not only

can act, but its action is identical with itself.
there can be no potentiality in its beine;, for
sequitur

~ ~

11

Therefore,

operari

modus operandi modum essendi." That which is

self-operative must be self-existent.

If there were in this

prime mover a transition from non-being to being, this could
be so only in virtue of a higher cause, and then we should no
loncer have the prime mover.3
2. The prime mover is infinitely perfect, because it is

pu!'e actuality without any admixture of potentiality.

This is

equally true whether we consider the essence or the action of
such a being.4
Act means the determination of being in point
of accomplishment and perfection; pure act is, therefore, pure perfection. It is at the same time pure
being; pure intellect:ton, al·uays in act, of pure
being always actually known; pure love, alwa:rs in
act, of the plenitude of bei~g always actually
loved.5
3. The pr5.me mover is immaterial and incorporeal.

It is

immaterial uecause matter is essentially a potential subject,
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susceptible of change, preeminently the subject of becoming.
The prime mover is, on the contrary, pure act, totally without
becoming.

It is not corporeal because not material.

A body

is composed of parts and depends on parts, whereas the pure
act excludes all composition and dependency.

There is no

question of more perfect or less perfect in the prime moYer,
because, being pure act, it is pure perfection.6
4. The prime mover is intelligent.

Immateriality is the

basis of intellieibility and of intelligence.7

Moreover, that

which moves aJ.l things toward an end must itself know that end
and the proportion of the things ordered toward that end.
5. The prime mover is omnipresent, because to move all
things demands the presence of the mover.
6. The prime mover is eternal, because it always has of
itself being and activity without any change.
can be no question of time, for time

~eans

With it there

succession, which

is impossible in pure act.
7. The prime mover is unique, because pure act cannot be
multiplied.

Were two pul"'e acts to be posited, then neither

would be pure act, for the very notion "two pure actstt is a
contradiction.
All of these attributes have been rationally deduced from
the notion "first im.>';l.Obile mover."

Hence, to deny that by the

sole force of reason man ca12 attain to a knowledge of the
existence of God is not only to show ignorance of the Thomsiti
argmaents, but to deny a fact evident to all men from the very
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begin;:-~ing3

of philosophic enquiry.

Finally, one word about the Prime Mover of Aristotle and
St. Thomas.

Most of the modern critics of t:'1e traditional

argu.r.1en ts for the existence of God, Haldane among them,
identify the proofs of the pagan and the saint.

This seems to

be true if one reads only the SULuna Contra Gentiles. But the
Summa Theologica contains St. Thomas' fully developed views
on the subject, and in them is seen how far apart are the
notions of the Prime Mover of the two philosophers.

True

enough the cosmography of both is the same, but, underneath
the physical analogy, what a metaphysical differencet

Aris-

totle eqaates the Prime Mover with local motion; St. Thomas
transports Him to the realn of Being.

Then, too, what a

difference in the notion of Godl
Lorsqll'on lit, dans les commentaires de la
Divine Come die, que le denier; vers du grande poeme
ne .fa1t que trac1uire la pensee d'Aristote, on est
bien loin de compte, car l 1 ar.1or che muove il Sole e
l'altre stelle n 1 a de comnun que 1e nom avec re-premier moteur immobile. Le Dieu de Saint Thomas
et de Dante est un Dieu qui aime, celui d 1 Aristote
est un Dieu qui se laisse aimcr; 1 1 araour qui meut
le ciel et les astres chez Aristote est l'amour du
ciel e=:t des astres pour Dieu, au lieu que celui
qt:.i les 111eut chez Saint Thomas et Dante est l'amour
de Dieu pour le monde;
, entl:'e les , deu.x causes motrices
il y a toute la difference qui separe la cause
finale de la cause efficiente. Et l'on doit aller
encore plus loin.8

Reru.:m Deus tenax vigor
Immotus in te permanens.
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